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SHOULD THE CHARTERED CITY'S CONTRACTOR BE
EXEMPT FROM CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC
WORKS ACT?
Since there can be no mechanics' liens against public property,1 mechanics
and materialmen have the substitute protection in California of the Public Works
Act.2 This statute requires a bond for the protection of mechanics and material-
men on public works projects, but it has twice been held that chartered cities and
their contractors do not have to obtain these bonds.3 Although the statute under
consideration in these decisions was a predecessor of the present statute, the
decisions apparently set an outer limit for the scope of the present statute, because
the old statute expressly extended its protection to contracts of "any city and
county, city, town or district therein... ."4 The present statute does not expressly
mention cities or municipalities.
These cases are fairly old.5 Because, as will be seen, the concept on which
they are based is subject to change as conditions change,6 it is the purpose of this
note to consider the present desirability of exempting chartered cities from the
application of the Public Works Act.
Background: The "Municipal Affairs" Concept in California
More than seventy percent of Californians live in cities, and most of these
Californians live in cities operating under local charters.7 Therefore, the impor-
tance of the activitities of chartered cities is not negligible.
This State has broad constitutional "municipal home rule" provisions.8 The key
1 There can be no lien for labor or supplies on property belonging to the public and
used for public purposes. Mayrhofer v. Board of Educ., 89 Cal. 110, 26 Pac. 646 (1891);
Sunlight Elec. Supply Co. v. McKee, 226 A.C.A. 75, 78, 37 Cal. Rptr. 782, 784 (1964)
(dictum).
2This is the name by which the present CAL. Cov'T CoDE §§ 4200-10 (Chapter
3 "Contractor's Bond" of Division 5 "Public Works and Public Purchases" of Title 1 of
the CAL. Cov'T CODE) are known. California Elec. Supply Co. v. United Pac. Life Ins.
Co., 227 A.C.A. 148, 154, 38 Cal. Rptr. 479, 482 (1964).
S Loop Lumber Co. v. Van Loben Sels, 173 Cal. 228, 159 Pac. 600 (1916);
Williams v. City of Vallejo, 36 Cal. App. 133, 171 Pac. 834 (1918).
4 Cal. Stat. 1911, ch. 734.
5 Or at least middle aged: forty-six and forty-four years old.
6 The municipal affairs concept, which is the basis for these decisions, fluctuates
with changes in the conditions of life. See note 13 infra for the cases establishing this
rule.
"Although only seventy cities, about one-fifth the total number of cities (383),
operate under local charters, these seventy include most of the city population of the
State. Cnoucu, McIIENRY, Bo=aVNs & ScoTr, CLA NomA G0oy mr AN PoLImcs
242,244 (3d ed. 1964).
8 California was the second state to adopt "municipal home rule." Crouch, The
California Way, 51 NAT'L Crvmc Ezv. 139 (1962). This is presumably based on CAL.
CoNsTr. art. XI, § 11 adopted in the Constitution of 1879. This section applies to all
cities as well as counties, towns, and townships, but merely gives such public bodies
power to make and enforce, within their own limits, "local, police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." The broader power given to char-
tered cities in the field of "municipal affairs" did not find its way into CAL. CoNsr. art.
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provision for our purposes is this: Cities may prepare and adopt charters which
allow them "to make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal
affairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in their several
charters, and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to and controlled by
general laws."9 What is meant by "municipal affairs" in the exercise of home rule
has not been settled, in that there is no final description in terms of the various
activities of municipalities. For reasons which will be presented, there can never
be such a final description.
It is well established that "municipal affairs" means the internal business affairs
of the municipality,' 0 but this definition only seems -to beg the question. What is
or is not an internal business affair of a municipality? The court says that it must
"decide, under the facts of each case, whether the subject matter under discussion
is of municipal or statewide concern."" If the subject matter under discussion is
of general statewide concern, the subject is not a municipal affair, and the general
State laws will prevail. 12
But something which at one time may be only an internal business affair of
a municipality may later become a matter of statewide concern, and our courts
have recognized this in applying the "municipal affairs" concept. The often quoted
statement recognizing the necessity for change in classification as the times change
is this: "[T]he term 'municipal affairs' is not a fixed quantity, but fluctuates with
every change in the conditions upon which it is to operate."13 The telephone
company cases14 are a good illustration of this rule in operation. In 1911 the court
XI, §§ 6, 8 until 1914, although the 1896 amendment to § 6 exempted charter provisions
pertaining to municipal affairs from the control of State laws. Missouri, which adopted
municipal home rule in 1875, was the first state to do so. Bromage, The Home Rule
Puzzle, 46 NAT'L MuNic. REv. 118, 121-22 (1957).
9 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6. (Emphasis added.) CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8(j) con-
tains almost identical language. Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 25, 1963, ratified
in the November 1964 general election, which amends CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6, does
not change the language quoted from the section previously in effect. See also CAL.
CoNsT. art. XI, § 11.
It should be noted that although the legislature must approve the charter, it must
approve or reject in toto. The legislature cannot amend the charter. CAL. CONST. art.
XI, § 8(g).
10 City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira, 47 Cal. 2d 804, 306 P.2d 453 (1957); Fragley
v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 58 Pac. 923 (1899).
11 Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 294, 384
P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963).
12 Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 11; Eastlick
v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 661, 177 P.2d 558 (1947); City of Pasadena v.
Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 10 P.2d 745 (1932); Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal. App.
2d 443, 168 P.2d 767 (1946).
13Helmer v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 140, 141-42, 191 Pac. 1001 (1920),
petition for supreme court hearing denied, 48 Cal. App. 147 (1920). Helmer is cited as
authority for the quoted rule at 105 A.L.R. 259, which is in turn cited for the same
reason in 37 Am. JuR. Municipal Corporations § 106 (1941). Restated in Butterworth
v. Boyd, 12 Cal. 2d 140, 82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838 (1938). See also 31 Ops. CAr..
ATr'Y GEN. 259 (1958).
14 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 336
P.2d 514 (1959), proceedings after remittitur, 197 Cal. App. 2d 133, 17 Cal. Rptr. 687
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decided that the maintenance of telephone poles and wires on city streets was a
municipal affair.15 This decision was followed as late as 1949,16 but in 1959 the
supreme court found that telephone service had become a matter of such general,
statewide concern that the construction and maintenance of telephone lines in the
streets and in other public places must also be a matter of general, statewide
concern.
17
How do you determine whether something is of general, statewide concern?
It has been said that the test of whether a matter is or is not of statewide concern
is the legislative purpose in each individual instance.18 It has also been said that
when there is any doubt as to whether a subject is truly a "municipal affair" the
doubt must be resolved in favor of State regulatory power.19
There seem, then, to be six general rules for determining the applicability
and effect of the constitutional "municipal affairs" provisions. (1) Only internal
business affairs of the municipality qualify as municipal affairs. (2) When the
subject matter is of general, statewide concern it is not a municipal affair. (3)
When the subject matter is found to be a municipal affair, and the municipality
operates under a charter which grants it legislative power over municipal affairs,
then the municipality is exempt from the operation of the general State laws in
respect to that subject matter 20 (4) The purpose of the State legislature in
enacting a particular statute determines whether the subject matter of the statute
is of general, statewide concern in any given situation. (5) Nothing is forever
fixed as being in or out of the municipal affairs category, since the municipal
affairs concept fluctuates with changes in the conditions of life. (6) If the classifi-
cation is doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the subject being a munici-
pal affair.21
(1961); Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 118 Pac. 796 (1911);
City of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 793, 208 P.2d 27 (1949).
15 Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 118 Pac. 796 (1911).
16 City of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 793, 208 P.2d 27
(1949).
17 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 336
P.2d 514 (1959), proceedings after remittitur, 197 Cal. App. 2d 133, 17 Cal. Rptr. 687
(1961).
18 Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 294, 384
P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963).
19TWA v. City & County of San Francisco, 228 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 919 (1956).2 0 The charter adopted under the constitutional home rule provisions actually
operates not as a grant of powers, but as a limitation and restriction on the exercise of
power over all municipal affairs, but an enumeration of specific powers does not consti-
tute an exclusion or limitation to those powers enumerated. City of Glendale v. Trond-
sen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 308 P.2d 1 (1957) holding a garbage collection fee valid as a tax as
well as a police measure even though there was no express authority for such a tax in the
charter, since such a taxing power is a municipal affair. See also 29 Ops. CAL. ATr'y
GEN . 184 (1957).
2 l Quaere: Might this be extended to mean that there is a rebuttable presumption
that any given subject is a matter of general, statewide concern, and the burden of proof
is on the party claiming that the subject is a municipal affair? The writer has found no
cases directly answering this question; cf. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
44 Cal. 2d 272, 280, 282 P.2d 36, 41 (1955) and Oro Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n,
169 Cal. 466, 477, 147 Pac. 118, 121-22 (1915) hinting at an affirmative answer.
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The Problem: Municipal Affairs and the Public Works Act
In Loop Lumber Co. v. Van Loben Sels22 a unanimous -court held that the
Public Works Act did not apply to a contract to do sewer work for a city. The
result was that a matenalman was not paid by the surety when the contractor
defaulted, even though the surety had furnished a bond for the benefit of laborers
and matenalmen mn accordance with the statute. The surety successfully defended
on grounds the statute did not apply to the sewer contract because the city charter
fully occupied the field of the letting of public contracts and required no bond.
Therefore the bond was void for lack of consideration. There was no consideration
because the "bond was given solely to secure the right on the part of the contrac-
tor to proceed with the performance of his contract with the city."23 Since the
statute did not apply, the right to proceed existed without the bond, and the bond
was secured by the contractor for no consideration. Does not this result seem
unjust?
In Williams v. City of Valleo 24 the district court of appeal followed Van Loben
Sels in an action against the city of Vallejo and individual members of the city's
board of public works to recover for work and material furmshed to a contractor
on a municipal reservoir project. The plaintiff's theory was that the defendants
were liable for his loss because they had not required the contractor to furnish the
bond required by the State statute. The court said 'the project was a municipal
affair. Therefore the statute was held inapplicable.
Aside from Van Loben Sels and Williams the question of the applicability of
the State labor and material bond law to chartered cities has not been litigated,2 5
but those cases are not forgotten. In 1957 the supreme court cited Van Loben Sels
as authority for the proposition that "collection, treatment, and the disposal of city
sewage and the making of contracts therefor are . . municipal affairs."20 But in
view of rule number two outlined above (%.e., what is or is not a municipal affair
changes as conditions change) the question of the applicability of the State labor
and material bond law to chartered cities is subject to being reopened.
The present question is whether, under current conditions, it was the legisla-
tive intent that requiring labor and material bonds on all public contract projects
be a matter of general, statewide concern. If the answer is yes this aspect of public
works contracts, which might in all other respects be solely municipal affairs, is
not a municipal affair.
Solving the Problem: Municipal or Statewide Concern?
The purpose of the Public Works Act has been explored by the courts.27 The
statute exists to create a fund to satisfy the claims of laborers and materialmen on
22 173 Cal. 228, 159 Pac. 600 (1916).
23 Id. at 231. 159 Pac. at 601.
2436 Cal. App. 133, 171 Pac. 834 (1918).
2 5 Nelson v. Trounce, 184 Cal. 732, 195 Pac. 393 (1921) held this kand of law
applicable to a school district contract executed by the board of education of a chartered
city, but the city charter which was involved in that case- specifically made powers and
duties of the board of education subject to State law.
26 City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48"Cal. 2d 93, 99, 308 P.2d 1, 4 (1957) (unani-
mous court).
27 Globe Indem. Co. v. Hanify, 217 Cal. 721, 20 P.2d 689 (1933); Pneucrete Corp.
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 733, 46 P.2d 1000 (1935); see also
33 Ops. CAL. Ar'y GEN. 129 (1959).
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projects on public property, since these laborers and materialmen cannot obtain
mechanics' liens.2 8 The statute is expressive of a broad public policy for the pro-
tection of laborers and materialmen.2 9 It has also been said, in determining the
intended scope of the law, that the statute was intended to apply to all govern-
mental agencies whose buildings or structures are not subject to the liens of
mechanics or materialmen 3 0
The present statute does not specifically mention cities, towns or municipal
corporations. The section requiring the bond speaks only of contracts "for the
State, or for any political subdivision or agency of the State. ... 31 Since the
statute which the court considered in 1916 in Van Loben Sels specifically included
every "city and county, city, town or district therein," it would seem a fortiori that
the present statute would be inapplicable.32 But on closer inspection the omission
of specific mention of cities in the later statute seems merely to be bad drafting.33
The section which prescribes the beneficiaries of the labor and material bond8 4
designates them as being those persons described in a section of the Code of Civil
Procedure 5 who are entitled to file claims, when they have not been paid by the
contractor, on public works contracts. Thus the whole labor and material bond
law is related to that section of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that section, in
talking about officers and public bodies by whom a public contract may have been
awarded, uses this language: "the commissioner, managers, trustees, officers, board
28 See note 1 supra.
29 Globe Indem. Co. v. Hanify, 217 Cal. 721, 20 P.2d 689 (1933); A. L. Young
Mach. Co. v. Cupps, 213 Cal. 210, 2 P.2d 321 (1931); see also 33 Ops. CAL. ATr'y
GEN. 129 (1959).
3 0 Sunset Lumber Co. v. Smith, 95 Cal. App. 307, 272 Pac. 1068 (1928).
31 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 4200. Equivalent language is used in § 4208, which condi-
tions the contractor's payment on the filing of a bond. Section 4210, which covers the
procedure for compliance with the stop notice requirement, uses "public agencies."
It is true that there are decisions determining cities, for certain purposes, not to be
political subdivisions of the State. Letter from Mr. Jack D. Wickware, Assistant Legal
Counsel, League of California Cities, to the author, August 28, 1964, citing Abbott v.
City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 438. 467, 326 P.2d 484, 501 (1958); Blum v. City &
County of San Francisco, 200 Cal. App. 2d 639, 643, 19 Cal. Rptr. 574, 576 (1962);
Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. App. 2d 605, 611-12, 126 P.2d 954, 958 (1942).
But, for other purposes, there is authority to the contrary: "[A] municipal corporation is
but a branch of the state government and is established for the purpose of aiding the
legislature in making provisions for the wants and welfare of the public within the
territory for which it is organized.... These words appeared in 1893 in In re Wet-
more, 99 Cal. 146, 150, 33 Pac. 769, 770, but the district court of appeal quoted the
language in 1918, four years after the present "municipal affairs" provisions became
part of the California constitution, in Akerman v. Moody, 38 Cal. App. 461, 464, 176
Pac. 696, 698.
32 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 4200. (Emphasis added.)
38 All other chapters of the Public Works and Public Purchases Division of the
CAL. Gov'T CODE specifically mention cities or municipal corporations. Chapters 1, 2.
4, and 5, Division 5, Title 1, CAL. GoV'T CODE. See §§ 4001 ("city"), 4103 ("city"),
4303 ("municipal corporation"), 4331 ("city"), 4332 ("city officers"), 4380 ("municipal
corporation"), 4401 (defining "public agency," for the purposes of Chapter 5, as includ-
ing "any... city").
34 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 4205.
• 5 CAL. CODE Cry. Pnoc. § 1192.1.
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